53 - Pentesting DNS
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The Domain Name Systems (DNS) is the phonebook of the Internet. Humans access information online through domain names, like nytimes.com or espn.com. Web browsers interact through Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers can load Internet resources.
From here.
Default port: 53
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
53/tcp open domain Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
5353/udp open zeroconf udp-response
53/udp open domain Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
Server Type | Description |
DNS Root Server | The root servers of the DNS are responsible for the top-level domains ( TLD). As the last instance, they are only requested if the name server does not respond. Thus, a root server is a central interface between users and content on the Internet, as it links domain and IP address. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates the work of the root name servers. There are 13 such root servers around the globe. |
Authoritative Nameserver | Authoritative name servers hold authority for a particular zone. They only answer queries from their area of responsibility, and their information is binding. If an authoritative name server cannot answer a client's query, the root name server takes over at that point. |
Non-authoritative Nameserver | Non-authoritative name servers are not responsible for a particular DNS zone. Instead, they collect information on specific DNS zones themselves, which is done using recursive or iterative DNS querying. |
Caching DNS Server | Caching DNS servers cache information from other name servers for a specified period. The authoritative name server determines the duration of this storage. |
Forwarding Server | Forwarding servers perform only one function: they forward DNS queries to another DNS server. |
Resolver | Resolvers are not authoritative DNS servers but perform name resolution locally in the computer or router. |
DNS does not have a "banner" to grab. The closest equivalent is a magic query for
version.bind. CHAOS TXT which will work on most BIND nameservers.
You can perform this query using dig:dig version.bind CHAOS TXT @DNS
If that does not work you can use fingerprinting techniques to determine the remote server's version -- the
fpdns tool is one option for that, but there are others.You can grab the banner also with a nmap script:
--script dns-nsid
The record ANY will ask the DNS server to return all the available entries that it is willing to disclose.
dig any victim.com @<DNS_IP>
This procedure is abbreviated
Asynchronous Full Transfer Zone (AXFR).dig axfr @<DNS_IP> #Try zone transfer without domain
dig axfr @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #Try zone transfer guessing the domain
fierce --domain <DOMAIN> --dns-servers <DNS_IP> #Will try toperform a zone transfer against every authoritative name server and if this doesn'twork, will launch a dictionary attack
dig ANY @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #Any information
dig A @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #Regular DNS request
dig AAAA @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #IPv6 DNS request
dig TXT @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #Information
dig MX @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #Emails related
dig NS @<DNS_IP> <DOMAIN> #DNS that resolves that name
dig -x 192.168.0.2 @<DNS_IP> #Reverse lookup
dig -x 2a00:1450:400c:c06::93 @<DNS_IP> #reverse IPv6 lookup
#Use [-p PORT] or -6 (to use ivp6 address of dns)
nslookup
> SERVER <IP_DNS> #Select dns server
> 127.0.0.1 #Reverse lookup of 127.0.0.1, maybe...
> <IP_MACHINE> #Reverse lookup of a machine, maybe...
auxiliary/gather/enum_dns #Perform enumeration actions
#Perform enumeration actions
nmap -n --script "(default and *dns*) or fcrdns or dns-srv-enum or dns-random-txid or dns-random-srcport" <IP>
dnsrecon -r 127.0.0.0/24 -n <IP_DNS> #DNS reverse of all of the addresses
dnsrecon -r 127.0.1.0/24 -n <IP_DNS> #DNS reverse of all of the addresses
dnsrecon -r <IP_DNS>/24 -n <IP_DNS> #DNS reverse of all of the addresses
dnsrecon -d active.htb -a -n <IP_DNS> #Zone transfer
If you are able to find subdomains resolving to internal IP-addresses, you should try to perform a reverse dns BF to the NSs of the domain asking for that IP range.
You can query reverse IP ranges to https://bgp.he.net/net/205.166.76.0/24#_dns (this tool is also helpful with BGP).
dnsenum --dnsserver <IP_DNS> --enum -p 0 -s 0 -o subdomains.txt -f subdomains-1000.txt <DOMAIN>
dnsrecon -D subdomains-1000.txt -d <DOMAIN> -n <IP_DNS>
dnscan -d <domain> -r -w subdomains-1000.txt #Bruteforce subdomains in recursive way, https://github.com/rbsec/dnscan
dig -t _gc._tcp.lab.domain.com
dig -t _ldap._tcp.lab.domain.com
dig -t _kerberos._tcp.lab.domain.com
dig -t _kpasswd._tcp.lab.domain.com
nmap --script dns-srv-enum --script-args "dns-srv-enum.domain='domain.com'"
#Query paypal subdomains to ns3.isc-sns.info
nmap -sSU -p53 --script dns-nsec-enum --script-args dns-nsec-enum.domains=paypal.com ns3.isc-sns.info
Brute force using "AAAA" requests to gather IPv6 of the subdomains.
dnsdict6 -s -t <domain>
Bruteforce reverse DNS in using IPv6 addresses
dnsrevenum6 pri.authdns.ripe.net 2001:67c:2e8::/48 #Will use the dns pri.authdns.ripe.net
If DNS recursion is enabled, an attacker could spoof the origin on the UDP packet in order to make the DNS send the response to the victim server. An attacker could abuse ANY or DNSSEC record types as they use to have the bigger responses.
The way to check if a DNS supports recursion is to query a domain name and check if the flag "ra" (recursion available) is in the response:
dig google.com A @<IP>
Non available:
Available:
DragonJAR Security Conference es un evento internacional de ciberseguridad con más de una década que se celebrará el 7 y 8 de septiembre de 2023 en Bogotá, Colombia. Es un evento de gran contenido técnico donde se presentan las últimas investigaciones en español que atrae a hackers e investigadores de todo el mundo.
¡Regístrate ahora en el siguiente enlace y no te pierdas esta gran conferencia!:
From book: Network Security Assessment (3rd edition)
Simply sending an email message to a nonexistent address at a target domain often reveals useful internal network information through a nondelivery notification (NDN).
Generating server: noa.nintendo.com
#550 5.1.1 RESOLVER.ADR.RecipNotFound; not found ##
Original message headers:
Received: from ONERDEDGE02.one.nintendo.com (10.13.20.35) by
onerdexch08.one.nintendo.com (10.13.30.39) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS)
id 14.3.174.1; Sat, 26 Apr 2014 16:52:22 -0700
Received: from barracuda.noa.nintendo.com (205.166.76.35) by
ONERDEDGE02.one.nintendo.com (10.13.20.35) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS)
id 14.3.174.1; Sat, 26 Apr 2014 16:51:22 -0700
X-ASG-Debug-ID: 1398556333-0614671716199b0d0001-zOQ9WJ
Received: from gateway05.websitewelcome.com (gateway05.websitewelcome.com [69.93.154.37]) by
barracuda.noa.nintendo.com with ESMTP id xVNPkwaqGgdyH5Ag for <[email protected]>; Sat,
26 Apr 2014 16:52:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Barracuda-Envelope-From: [email protected]
X-Barracuda-Apparent-Source-IP: 69.93.154.37
The following data in this transcript is useful:
- Internal hostnames, IP addresses, and subdomain layout
- The mail server is running Microsoft Exchange Server 2010 SP3
- A Barracuda Networks device is used to perform content filtering
host.conf
/etc/resolv.conf
/etc/bind/named.conf
/etc/bind/named.conf.local
/etc/bind/named.conf.options
/etc/bind/named.conf.log
/etc/bind/*
Dangerous settings when configuring a Bind server:
Option | Description |
allow-query | Defines which hosts are allowed to send requests to the DNS server. |
allow-recursion | Defines which hosts are allowed to send recursive requests to the DNS server. |
allow-transfer | Defines which hosts are allowed to receive zone transfers from the DNS server. |
zone-statistics | Collects statistical data of zones. |
Protocol_Name: DNS #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
Port_Number: 53 #Comma separated if there is more than one.
Protocol_Description: Domain Name Service #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
Entry_1:
Name: Notes
Description: Notes for DNS
Note: |
#These are the commands I run every time I see an open DNS port
dnsrecon -r 127.0.0.0/24 -n {IP} -d {Domain_Name}
dnsrecon -r 127.0.1.0/24 -n {IP} -d {Domain_Name}
dnsrecon -r {Network}{CIDR} -n {IP} -d {Domain_Name}
dig axfr @{IP}
dig axfr {Domain_Name} @{IP}
nslookup
SERVER {IP}
127.0.0.1
{IP}
Domain_Name
exit
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-dns
Entry_2:
Name: Banner Grab
Description: Grab DNS Banner
Command: dig version.bind CHAOS TXT @DNS
Entry_3:
Name: Nmap Vuln Scan
Description: Scan for Vulnerabilities with Nmap
Command: nmap -n --script "(default and *dns*) or fcrdns or dns-srv-enum or dns-random-txid or dns-random-srcport" {IP}
Entry_4:
Name: Zone Transfer
Description: Three attempts at forcing a zone transfer
Command: dig axfr @{IP} && dix axfr @{IP} {Domain_Name} && fierce --dns-servers {IP} --domain {Domain_Name}
Entry_5:
Name: Active Directory
Description: Eunuerate a DC via DNS
Command: dig -t _gc._{Domain_Name} && dig -t _ldap._{Domain_Name} && dig -t _kerberos._{Domain_Name} && dig -t _kpasswd._{Domain_Name} && nmap --script dns-srv-enum --script-args "dns-srv-enum.domain={Domain_Name}"
Entry_6:
Name: consolesless mfs enumeration
Description: DNS enumeration without the need to run msfconsole
Note: sourced from https://github.com/carlospolop/legion
Command: msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/dns/dns_amp; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 53; run; exit' && msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/gather/enum_dns; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 53; run; exit'
DragonJAR Security Conference es un evento internacional de ciberseguridad con más de una década que se celebrará el 7 y 8 de septiembre de 2023 en Bogotá, Colombia. Es un evento de gran contenido técnico donde se presentan las últimas investigaciones en español que atrae a hackers e investigadores de todo el mundo.
¡Regístrate ahora en el siguiente enlace y no te pierdas esta gran conferencia!:
- Do you work in a cybersecurity company? Do you want to see your company advertised in HackTricks? or do you want to have access to the latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF? Check the SUBSCRIPTION PLANS!