Is the API that can be use to authenticate users.
The SSPI will be in charge of finding the adequate protocol for two machines that want to communicate. The preferred method for this is Kerberos. Then the SSPI will negotiate which authentication protocol will be used, this authentication protocols are called Security Support Provider (SSP), are located inside each Windows machine in the form of a DLL and both machines must support the same to be able to communicate.
Kerberos: The preferred one
NTLMv1 and NTLMv2: Compatibility reasons
Digest: Web servers and LDAP, password in form of a MD5 hash
Schannel: SSL and TLS
Negotiate: It is used to negotiate the protol to use (Kerberos or NTLM being Kerberos the default one)
The credentials (hashed) are saved in the memory of this subsystem for Single Sign-On reasons. LSA administrates the local security policy (password policy, users permissions...), authentication, access tokens... LSA will be the one that will check for provided credentials inside the SAM file (for a local login) and talk with the domain controller to authenticate a domain user.
The credentials are saved inside the process LSASS: Kerberos tickets, hashes NT and LM, easily decrypted passwords.
Local credentials are present in this file, the passwords are hashed.
We have talk about this. Different credentials are saved in the memory of this process.
LSA could save in disk some credentials:
Password of the computer account of the Active Directory (unreachable domain controller).
Passwords of the accounts of Windows services
Passwords for scheduled tasks
More (password of IIS applications...)
Is the database of the Active Directory. It is only present in Domain Controllers.
Allows browsers and other Windows applications to save credentials.
It is used to describe the security context of a process or a thread.
When a user logins, he is given an access token, and when the user create a process, an access token derivated from the one of the user is assigned. The token contains information like the SID of the uses, the groups of the user, the privileges assigned to the user and its groups...
You can see this information executing
whoami /all or using Process Explorer from Sysinternals.
When a local administrators logins two access tokens are created: One with admin rights and other one with normal rights (Default one), and to execute a process as administrator the UAC is involved.
The access token has also a reference of the logon sessions inside the LSASS, this is useful if the process needs to access some objects of the network.
You can see the current logon sessions executing as administrator the binary logonsessions of Sysinternals. You can create a new logon session with new credentials that will be used only in the network:
runas /user:domain\username /netonly cmd.exe
Using the incognito module of metasploit you can easily list and impersonate other tokens. This could be useful to perform actions as if you where the other user. You could also escalate privileges with this technique.
UAC is used to allow an administrator user to not give administrator privileges to each process executed. This is achieved using default the low privileged token of the user. When, the administrator executes some process as administrator, a UAC elevation is performed and if it is successfully completed, the privileged token is used to create the process.
To differentiate between which process is executed with low or high privileges is used the Mandatory integrity Controls (MIC). There are 5 levels of integrity:
Untrusted(0): Processes launched by members of the Guest group. Writing operations are mostly blocked.
Low(1): Used by Internet Explorer. File and registry writing is blocked.
Medium(2): When UAC is enabled, this is the default level of integrity. A process in this level can request to elevate his integrity level.
High(3): Processes running with administrator privileges.
System(4): Services and other applications (Wininit, Winlogon, Smss...)
Some programs are autoelevated automatically if the user belongs to the administrator group. This binaries has inside their Manifests the autoElevate option with value True. The binary has to be signed by Microsoft also.
Then, to bypass the UAC (elevate from medium integrity level to high) some attackers use this kind of binaries to execute arbitrary code because it will be executed from a High level integrity process.
You can check the Manifest of a binary using the tool sigcheck.exe from Sysinternals. An you can see the integrity level of the processes using Process Explorer or Process Monitor (of Sysinternals).
First you need to check the value of the key EnableLUA, if it's
1 then UAC is activated, if its
0 or it doesn't exist, then UAC is inactive.
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\
Then you have to check the value of the key
ConsentPromptBehaviorAdminin the same entry of the registry as before (info from here):
0 then, UAC won't prompt (like disabled)
1 the admin is asked for username and password to execute the binary with high rights (on Secure Desktop)
2 (Always notify me) UAC will always ask for confirmation to the administrator when he tries to execute something with high privileges (on Secure Desktop)
1 but not necessary on Secure Desktop
2 but not necessary on Secure Desktop
5(default) it will ask the administrator to confirm to run non Windows binaries with high privileges
Then, you have to take a look to the value of
If the value is
0, then, only the RID 500 user (built-in Administrator) is able to perform admin tasks without UAC, and if its
1, all accounts inside "Administrators" group can do them.
And, finally take a look to the value of the key
0(default), the built-in Administrator account can do remote administration tasks and if
1 the built-in account Administrator cannot do remote administration tasks, unless
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy is set to
EnableLUA=0or doesn't exist, no UAC for anyone
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=1 , No UAC for anyone
FilterAdministratorToken=0, No UAC for RID 500 (Built-in Administrator)
FilterAdministratorToken=1, UAC for everyone
It is important to mention that is much harder to bypass the UAC if it is in the higest security level (Always) than if it is in any of the other levels (Default).
The UAC bypass is needed in the following situation: the UAC is activated, your process is running in a medium integrity context, and your user belongs to the administrators group.
All this information can be gathered using the metasploit module:
You can also check the groups of your user and get the integrity level:
net user %username%whoami /groups | findstr Level
If you have a shell with a user that is inside the Administrators group you can mount the C$ shared via SMB (file system) local in a new disk and you will have access to everything inside the file system (even Administrator home folder)
net use Z: \\127.0.0.1\c$cd C$
Or you could just access it:
All the techniques used here to bypass AUC require a full interactive shell with the victim (a common nc.exe shell is not enough).
You can get using a meterpreter session. Migrate to a process that has the Session value equals to 1:
(explorer.exe should works)
Empire and Metasploit have several modules to bypass the UAC. You should also check the tool: UACME
Find a binary that will autoelevate (check that when it is executed it runs in a high integrity level).
With procmon find "NAME NOT FOUND" events that can be vulnerable to DLL Hijacking.
You probably will need to write the DLL inside some protected path (like C:\Windows\System32) were you don't have writing permissions. You can bypass this using:
wusa.exe: Windows 7,8 and 8.1. It allows to extract the content of a CAB file inside protected paths (because this tool is executed from a high integrity level).
IFileOperation: Windows 10.
Prepare a script to copy your DLL inside the protected path and execute the vulnerable and autoelevated binary.
Consist on watching if an autoElevated binary try to read from the registry the name/path of a binary or command to be executed (this is more interesting if the binary search this information inside the HKCU).
EFS works by encrypting a file with a bulk symmetric key, also known as the File Encryption Key, or FEK. The FEK is then encrypted with a public key that is associated with the user who encrypted the file, and this encrypted FEK is stored in the $EFS alternative data stream of the encrypted file. To decrypt the file, the EFS component driver uses the private key that matches the EFS digital certificate (used to encrypt the file) to decrypt the symmetric key that is stored in the $EFS stream. From here.
Examples of files being decrypted without the user asking for it:
Files and folders are decrypted before being copied to a volume formatted with another file system, like FAT32.
Encrypted files are copied over the network using the SMB/CIFS protocol, the files are decrypted before they are sent over the network.
The encrypted files using this method can be tansparently access by the owner user (the one who has encrypted them), so if you can become that user you can decrypt the files (changing the password of the user and logins as him won't work).
Check if a user have used this service checking if this path exists:
Check who have access to the file using cipher /c <file>
You can also use
cipher /e and
cipher /d inside a folder to encrypt and decrypt all the files
This way requires the victim user to be running some process inside the host. If that is the case, using a
meterpreter sessions you can impersonate the token of the process of the user (
incognito). Or you could just
migrate to process of the user.