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Osnovne informacije

macOS Pesak (inicijalno nazvan Seatbelt) ograničava aplikacije koje se izvršavaju unutar peska na dozvoljene akcije navedene u profilu peska sa kojim se aplikacija izvršava. Ovo pomaže da se osigura da aplikacija pristupa samo očekivanim resursima.

Bilo koja aplikacija sa ovlašćenjem com.apple.security.app-sandbox će biti izvršena unutar peska. Apple binarni fajlovi se obično izvršavaju unutar peska i kako bi se objavili u App Store-u, ovo ovlašćenje je obavezno. Dakle, većina aplikacija će biti izvršena unutar peska.

Da bi se kontrolisalo šta proces može ili ne može da radi, Pesak ima kuke u svim sistemskim pozivima širom jezgra. Zavisno o ovlašćenjima aplikacije, Pesak će dozvoliti određene akcije.

Neki važni komponenti Peska su:

  • Kernel ekstenzija /System/Library/Extensions/Sandbox.kext

  • Privatni okvir /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/AppSandbox.framework

  • Demon koji se izvršava u korisničkom prostoru /usr/libexec/sandboxd

  • Kontejneri ~/Library/Containers

Unutar foldera kontejnera možete pronaći folder za svaku aplikaciju koja se izvršava u pesku sa imenom identifikatora paketa (bundle id):

ls -l ~/Library/Containers
total 0
drwx------@ 4 username  staff  128 May 23 20:20 com.apple.AMPArtworkAgent
drwx------@ 4 username  staff  128 May 23 20:13 com.apple.AMPDeviceDiscoveryAgent
drwx------@ 4 username  staff  128 Mar 24 18:03 com.apple.AVConference.Diagnostic
drwx------@ 4 username  staff  128 Mar 25 14:14 com.apple.Accessibility-Settings.extension
drwx------@ 4 username  staff  128 Mar 25 14:10 com.apple.ActionKit.BundledIntentHandler
[...]

Unutar svake fascikle sa identifikacijom paketa možete pronaći plist i Data direktorijum aplikacije:

cd /Users/username/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari
ls -la
total 104
drwx------@   4 username  staff    128 Mar 24 18:08 .
drwx------  348 username  staff  11136 May 23 20:57 ..
-rw-r--r--    1 username  staff  50214 Mar 24 18:08 .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist
drwx------   13 username  staff    416 Mar 24 18:05 Data

ls -l Data
total 0
drwxr-xr-x@  8 username  staff   256 Mar 24 18:08 CloudKit
lrwxr-xr-x   1 username  staff    19 Mar 24 18:02 Desktop -> ../../../../Desktop
drwx------   2 username  staff    64 Mar 24 18:02 Documents
lrwxr-xr-x   1 username  staff    21 Mar 24 18:02 Downloads -> ../../../../Downloads
drwx------  35 username  staff  1120 Mar 24 18:08 Library
lrwxr-xr-x   1 username  staff    18 Mar 24 18:02 Movies -> ../../../../Movies
lrwxr-xr-x   1 username  staff    17 Mar 24 18:02 Music -> ../../../../Music
lrwxr-xr-x   1 username  staff    20 Mar 24 18:02 Pictures -> ../../../../Pictures
drwx------   2 username  staff    64 Mar 24 18:02 SystemData
drwx------   2 username  staff    64 Mar 24 18:02 tmp

Imajte na umu da čak i ako su simboličke veze tu da "pobegnu" iz Sandbox-a i pristupe drugim fasciklama, aplikacija i dalje mora imati dozvole da im pristupi. Ove dozvole se nalaze unutar .plist fajla.

# Get permissions
plutil -convert xml1 .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist -o -

# Binary sandbox profile
<key>SandboxProfileData</key>
<data>
AAAhAboBAAAAAAgAAABZAO4B5AHjBMkEQAUPBSsGPwsgASABHgEgASABHwEf...

# In this file you can find the entitlements:
<key>Entitlements</key>
<dict>
<key>com.apple.MobileAsset.PhishingImageClassifier2</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.accounts.appleaccount.fullaccess</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.appattest.spi</key>
<true/>
<key>keychain-access-groups</key>
<array>
<string>6N38VWS5BX.ru.keepcoder.Telegram</string>
<string>6N38VWS5BX.ru.keepcoder.TelegramShare</string>
</array>
[...]

# Some parameters
<key>Parameters</key>
<dict>
<key>_HOME</key>
<string>/Users/username</string>
<key>_UID</key>
<string>501</string>
<key>_USER</key>
<string>username</string>
[...]

# The paths it can access
<key>RedirectablePaths</key>
<array>
<string>/Users/username/Downloads</string>
<string>/Users/username/Documents</string>
<string>/Users/username/Library/Calendars</string>
<string>/Users/username/Desktop</string>
<key>RedirectedPaths</key>
<array/>
[...]

Sve što je kreirano/izmenjeno od strane aplikacije u pesku će dobiti atribut karantina. Ovo će sprečiti prostor peska da pokrene Gatekeeper ako aplikacija u pesku pokuša da izvrši nešto sa open.

Profili peska

Profil peska su konfiguracioni fajlovi koji ukazuju šta će biti dozvoljeno/zabranjeno u tom pesku. Koristi se jezik profila peska (SBPL), koji koristi Scheme programski jezik.

Ovde možete pronaći primer:

(version 1) ; First you get the version

(deny default) ; Then you shuold indicate the default action when no rule applies

(allow network*) ; You can use wildcards and allow everything

(allow file-read* ; You can specify where to apply the rule
(subpath "/Users/username/")
(literal "/tmp/afile")
(regex #"^/private/etc/.*")
)

(allow mach-lookup
(global-name "com.apple.analyticsd")
)

Pogledajte ovaj istraživački rad da biste proverili više akcija koje mogu biti dozvoljene ili odbijene.

Važne sistemske usluge takođe se izvršavaju unutar svojih sopstvenih prilagođenih sandbox-ova, kao što je mdnsresponder usluga. Ove prilagođene sandbox profile možete videti unutar:

Aplikacije iz App Store-a koriste profil /System/Library/Sandbox/Profiles/application.sb. U ovom profilu možete proveriti kako ovlašćenja poput com.apple.security.network.server omogućavaju procesu korišćenje mreže.

SIP je Sandbox profil nazvan platform_profile u /System/Library/Sandbox/rootless.conf

Primeri Sandbox Profila

Da biste pokrenuli aplikaciju sa određenim sandbox profilom, možete koristiti:

sandbox-exec -f example.sb /Path/To/The/Application
touch.sb
(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow file-read-metadata)
(allow file-write-metadata)
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/tmp/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/tmp/"))
(allow file-read-data (regex #"^/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[C,T]/"))
(allow file-write-data (regex #"^/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[C,T]/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/C/C/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/C/T/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/T/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/C/T/C/T/"))
(allow file-write-data (literal "/private/var/folders/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/
```scheme
(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow file* (literal "/tmp/hacktricks.txt"))
# This will fail because default is denied, so it cannot execute touch
sandbox-exec -f touch.sb touch /tmp/hacktricks.txt
# Check logs
log show --style syslog --predicate 'eventMessage contains[c] "sandbox"' --last 30s
[...]
2023-05-26 13:42:44.136082+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: sandbox-exec(41398) deny(1) process-exec* /usr/bin/touch
2023-05-26 13:42:44.136100+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: sandbox-exec(41398) deny(1) file-read-metadata /usr/bin/touch
2023-05-26 13:42:44.136321+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: sandbox-exec(41398) deny(1) file-read-metadata /var
2023-05-26 13:42:52.701382+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) 5 duplicate reports for Sandbox: sandbox-exec(41398) deny(1) file-read-metadata /var
[...]
touch2.sb
(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow file* (literal "/tmp/hacktricks.txt"))
(allow process* (literal "/usr/bin/touch"))
; This will also fail because:
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840002+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) file-read-metadata /usr/bin/touch
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840016+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) file-read-data /usr/bin/touch
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840028+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) file-read-data /usr/bin
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840034+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) file-read-metadata /usr/lib/dyld
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840050+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) sysctl-read kern.bootargs
; 2023-05-26 13:44:59.840061+0200  localhost kernel[0]: (Sandbox) Sandbox: touch(41575) deny(1) file-read-data /
touch3.sb
(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow file* (literal "/private/tmp/hacktricks.txt"))
(allow process* (literal "/usr/bin/touch"))
(allow file-read-data (literal "/"))
; This one will work

Napomena da Apple-ov softver koji se pokreće na Windowsu nema dodatne sigurnosne mere, kao što je sandboxing aplikacija.

Primeri zaobilaženja:

Profili macOS Sandbox-a

macOS čuva sistemske profile sandbox-a na dve lokacije: /usr/share/sandbox/ i /System/Library/Sandbox/Profiles.

Ako treća strana aplikacija ima com.apple.security.app-sandbox privilegiju, sistem primenjuje profil /System/Library/Sandbox/Profiles/application.sb na taj proces.

iOS Sandbox Profil

Podrazumevani profil se naziva container i nemamo SBPL tekstualnu reprezentaciju. U memoriji, ovaj sandbox je predstavljen kao binarno stablo Dozvoli/Odbij za svaku dozvolu iz sandbox-a.

Debugiranje i zaobilaženje Sandbox-a

Na macOS-u, za razliku od iOS-a gde su procesi od početka sandbox-ovani od strane jezgra, procesi moraju sami da se odluče za sandbox. To znači da na macOS-u, proces nije ograničen sandbox-om sve dok aktivno ne odluči da uđe u njega.

Procesi automatski dobijaju Sandbox kada se pokrenu iz korisničkog prostora ako imaju privilegiju: com.apple.security.app-sandbox. Za detaljno objašnjenje ovog procesa pogledajte:

pagemacOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass

Provera privilegija PID-a

Prema ovome, sandbox_check (to je __mac_syscall), može proveriti da li je operacija dozvoljena ili ne od strane sandbox-a za određeni PID.

Alatka sbtool može proveriti da li PID može izvršiti određenu radnju:

sbtool <pid> mach #Check mac-ports (got from launchd with an api)
sbtool <pid> file /tmp #Check file access
sbtool <pid> inspect #Gives you an explaination of the sandbox profile
sbtool <pid> all

Prilagođeni SBPL u aplikacijama App Store-a

Moguće je da kompanije svoje aplikacije pokreću sa prilagođenim Sandbox profilima (umesto sa podrazumevanim). Za to je potrebno koristiti privilegiju com.apple.security.temporary-exception.sbpl koju mora odobriti Apple.

Moguće je proveriti definiciju ove privilegije u /System/Library/Sandbox/Profiles/application.sb:

(sandbox-array-entitlement
"com.apple.security.temporary-exception.sbpl"
(lambda (string)
(let* ((port (open-input-string string)) (sbpl (read port)))
(with-transparent-redirection (eval sbpl)))))

Ovo će proceniti string nakon ovog ovlašćenja kao Sandbox profil.

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