AD CS Account Persistence

Support HackTricks

Hii ni muhtasari mdogo wa sura za kudumu za mashine kutoka kwa utafiti mzuri wa https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf

Kuelewa Wizi wa Akreditif za Watumiaji Wanaofanya Kazi kwa kutumia Vyeti – PERSIST1

Katika hali ambapo cheti kinachoruhusu uthibitisho wa kikoa kinaweza kuombwa na mtumiaji, mshambuliaji ana fursa ya kuomba na kuchukua cheti hiki ili kuhifadhi kudumu kwenye mtandao. Kwa kawaida, kiolezo cha User katika Active Directory kinaruhusu maombi kama haya, ingawa wakati mwingine kinaweza kuzuiliwa.

Kwa kutumia chombo kinachoitwa Certify, mtu anaweza kutafuta vyeti halali vinavyowezesha ufikiaji wa kudumu:

Certify.exe find /clientauth

Inasisitizwa kwamba nguvu ya cheti iko katika uwezo wake wa kujiuthibitisha kama mtumiaji anayemilikiwa, bila kujali mabadiliko yoyote ya nenosiri, mradi cheti kimebaki halali.

Vyeti vinaweza kuombwa kupitia kiolesura cha picha kwa kutumia certmgr.msc au kupitia mstari wa amri na certreq.exe. Pamoja na Certify, mchakato wa kuomba cheti umewekwa rahisi kama ifuatavyo:

Certify.exe request /ca:CA-SERVER\CA-NAME /template:TEMPLATE-NAME

Upon successful request, a certificate along with its private key is generated in .pem format. To convert this into a .pfx file, which is usable on Windows systems, the following command is utilized:

Baada ya ombi kufanikiwa, cheti pamoja na ufunguo wake wa faragha kinatengenezwa katika muundo wa .pem. Ili kubadilisha hii kuwa faili ya .pfx, ambayo inaweza kutumika kwenye mifumo ya Windows, amri ifuatayo inatumika:

openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

Faili la .pfx linaweza kupakiwa kwenye mfumo wa lengo na kutumika na chombo kinachoitwa Rubeus kuomba Tiketi ya Kutoa Tiketi (TGT) kwa mtumiaji, ikipanua ufikiaji wa mshambuliaji kwa muda mrefu kama cheti ni halali (kawaida mwaka mmoja):

Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:harmj0y /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx /password:CertPass!

An important warning is shared about how this technique, combined with another method outlined in the THEFT5 section, allows an attacker to persistently obtain an account’s NTLM hash without interacting with the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), and from a non-elevated context, providing a stealthier method for long-term credential theft.

Gaining Machine Persistence with Certificates - PERSIST2

Another method involves enrolling a compromised system’s machine account for a certificate, utilizing the default Machine template which allows such actions. If an attacker gains elevated privileges on a system, they can use the SYSTEM account to request certificates, providing a form of persistence:

Certify.exe request /ca:dc.theshire.local/theshire-DC-CA /template:Machine /machine

This access enables the attacker to authenticate to Kerberos as the machine account and utilize S4U2Self to obtain Kerberos service tickets for any service on the host, effectively granting the attacker persistent access to the machine.

Kuongeza Uthibitisho Kupitia Upya Leseni - PERSIST3

Njia ya mwisho iliyozungumziwa inahusisha kutumia uhalali na muda wa upya wa mifano ya leseni. Kwa kuhuisha leseni kabla ya kuisha, mshambuliaji anaweza kudumisha uthibitisho kwa Active Directory bila haja ya kujiandikisha tiketi za ziada, ambazo zinaweza kuacha alama kwenye seva ya Mamlaka ya Leseni (CA).

Njia hii inaruhusu mbinu ya kudumu iliyopanuliwa, ikipunguza hatari ya kugunduliwa kupitia mwingiliano mdogo na seva ya CA na kuepuka uzalishaji wa vitu ambavyo vinaweza kuwajulisha wasimamizi kuhusu uvamizi.

Last updated